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FEATURE COMMENT: Withdrawing The
U.S. From The WTO GPA: Assessing
Potential Damage To The U.S. And Its
Contracting Community
The Trump Administration is mulling an executive order that would trigger U.S. withdrawal from
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA), according
to reports from Bloomberg and POLITICO. E.g.,
Trump Considers Withdrawing From WTO’s $1.7
Trillion Purchasing Pact, Bloomberg, Feb. 4, 2020,
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-04/
trump-mulls-withdrawal-from-wto-s-1-7-trillionpurchasing-pact. Withdrawal from the GPA would
deprive U.S. suppliers of a key point of access to
public procurement markets internationally, under a world-wide agreement that has set global
standards and opened over a trillion dollars annually in business opportunities. See, e.g., Robert
D. Anderson et al., “Assessing the Value of Future
Accessions to the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA): Some New Data Sources, Provisional Estimates, and An Evaluative Framework
for Individual WTO Members Considering Accession,” 2012 Pub. Proc. Law Rev. 113, www.wto.org/
english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201115_e.pdf. The U.S.
could forfeit access to important public procurement
markets in Canada and many other countries, and
the U.S. could lose its leadership role (which dates
back to World War II) in shaping global standards
in public procurement, even as more countries are
joining the GPA.
The GPA: an Essential Foundation for
Efficient Government Contracting Worldwide—The WTO’s GPA is the world’s premier tool
4-258-826-8
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for establishing and enforcing open markets for
government contracting internationally. The GPA
has three main elements: (1) binding guarantees
of non-discriminatory treatment in covered public
procurements run by the 48 WTO member governments covered by the GPA (including the European
Union, Canada, Israel and many other industrialized and developing nations); (2) important transparency and procedural requirements that ensure
U.S. and other offshore suppliers have access to
the information necessary to compete fairly; and
(3) a guarantee that all participating countries will
have in place effective domestic review (bid protest) procedures to adjudicate supplier complaints.
Estimates vary, but the GPA is generally thought
to cover about $1.7 trillion in public procurements,
world-wide. See, e.g., Robert D. Anderson & Nadezdha Sporysheva, “The Revised WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement: Evolving Global Footprint, Economic Impact and Policy Significance,”
2019 Pub. Proc. Law Rev. 71 (available on Westlaw).
The U.S. originally proposed an international
agreement to open world public procurement markets in the months after World War II, and versions
of the GPA have been in place since 1979, all prepared with extensive U.S. involvement during both
Republican and Democratic administrations. In fact,
it is safe to say that the GPA would not exist without
U.S. leadership. The current version was adopted in
2012, and embodies modernized procedural requirements, improved market access commitments and,
significantly, pathbreaking anti-corruption requirements that were strongly supported by the U.S.
E.g., Anderson, Schooner & Swan, Feature Comment: “The WTO’s Revised Government Procurement Agreement—An Important Milestone Toward
Greater Market Access And Transparency in Global
Public Procurement Markets,” 54 GC ¶ 1.
The GPA Is Becoming More Important
Over Time—Currently, 48 WTO member jurisdictions are covered by the GPA. Other major economies, including China and the Russian Federation,
are bidding to join the GPA, which will require
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them to open their public procurement markets
on fair and competitive terms. India is an observer
(typically the first step to joining the GPA), and many
other developing nations have entered the accession
process. Brazil announced last month that it intends
to join the GPA, as part of a broader effort to check
corruption and join international markets. E.g., “Brazil Announces It Will Adhere to the International
Agreement on Government Procurement,” Nat. Law
Rev., Jan. 23, 2020, www.natlawreview.com/article/
brazil-announces-it-will-adhere-to-internationalagreement-government-procurement.
The United Kingdom, for its part, has made clear
its firm determination to continue to be bound by and
enjoy the benefits of GPA participation following its
exit from the EU. See WTO, “UK set to become a party
to the Government Procurement Agreement in its own
right,” Feb. 27, 2019, www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news19_e/gpro_27feb19_e.htm. This is not surprising,
given the extent to which contractors (from the UK
and elsewhere) rely on the GPA’s assurances of fair
treatment and access in a rapidly globalizing public
procurement market.
For the U.S. supplier community, it is important to
understand that as an existing party to the GPA, by
the terms of the GPA the U.S. is entitled to block the
admission of new parties to the GPA (such as China
and Russia) unless the U.S. is satisfied with the new
parties’ offers of market access and reforms to their
national procurement systems. Furthermore, in our
experience, the U.S. exercises its influence and negotiating heft adroitly and without hesitation to protect
the interests of U.S. suppliers. See, e.g., Christopher
Yukins & Johannes Schnitzer, “GPA Accession: Lessons
Learned on the Strengths and Weaknesses of the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement,” 7 Trade Law &
Dev. J. 89 (2015). The U.S. will also have a seat at the
table and well-established position of influence when,
as is inevitable, the GPA is revised and renegotiated.
The U.S. will, however, lose all of this critical negotiating leverage if in fact it withdraws from the GPA.
Misconceptions Regarding the Balance of
U.S. Interests in the GPA—Some critics’ views of
the GPA have been informed, at least in part, by a
misunderstanding of the opportunities available to
U.S. suppliers under the GPA. A 2017 report by the
Government Accountability Office concluded that the
U.S. had opened access to about $837 billion worth
of its procurement contracts annually, whereas the
next five largest GPA parties—the EU, Japan, South
2
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Korea, Norway and Canada—had provided access to
only about $381 billion worth of procurements. See
United States Reported Opening More Opportunities
to Foreign Firms Than Other Countries, but Better
Data Are Needed (GAO-17-168), available at www.
gao.gov/assets/690/682663.pdf. GAO acknowledged,
though, that the available data were incomplete, and
the report missed important structural advantages
that the U.S. enjoys under the GPA.
Unlike the member states of the EU, which provide comprehensive access to national, provincial
and local markets, only 37 of the 50 U.S. states have
opened (and only partially opened) their markets under the GPA. The U.S. also excludes federally funded
mass transit and highway projects and almost all municipalities from the GPA, and excludes the extensive
preferences (including small business preferences)
which may cover roughly a quarter of the federal procurement market. The EU, which favors open markets
as a matter of principle, affords much broader coverage
to sub-central and public utility procurements.
Other reports by GAO and the European Commission have pointed out that the true level of foreign
penetration in the U.S. and EU markets is relatively
low. This may well be due to de facto local preferences
(“home bias”) in public purchasing. This argues for
reinforcing, rather than abandoning, market-opening
measures under the GPA, if U.S. suppliers hope to
broaden their access to foreign markets.
The GAO report did not address specifically the
matter of access to Canadian public procurement
markets, which has recently emerged as a potentially serious issue were the U.S. to abandon the GPA.
Canada added an estimated $100 billion to its GPA
commitments in the course of the renegotiation that
culminated in 2012, see Robert D. Anderson, “The
Conclusion of the Renegotiation of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: What it Means
for the Agreement and for the World Economy,” 2012
Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 83—a renegotiation in which the
U.S. itself gave up relatively little in the way of new
market-opening commitments. This important access
to Canadian procurement markets could be forfeited if
the U.S. abandoned the GPA, because Canada refused
to open its public procurement markets under the new
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
As Jean Heilman Grier, the former lead negotiator
on government procurement for the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, noted with regard to U.S. reliance on the GPA to access Canadian public markets:
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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When the [USMCA] is implemented, it will terminate the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which gives [U.S. suppliers] rights to
participate in Canada’s federal procurement market. By contrast, the USMCA excluded Canada
from its procurement obligations. The administration, however, assured U.S. suppliers that
they would continue to have access to Canadian
procurement under the GPA.

Jean Heilman Grier, “Consequences of Potential U.S.
Withdrawal from GPA,” trade.djaghe.com/?p=6244.
Withdrawal from the GPA thus would deprive U.S.
suppliers of hard-won rights to participate in Canadian government procurements, rights that were
enjoyed for years under NAFTA and were supposed
to survive the transition to the USMCA, based on
Canada’s separate commitments in the GPA and the
assumption that the U.S. would remain in the GPA.
See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, “The United States in
International Procurement: Understanding a Pause
in the Trump Administration’s Protectionism,” 2019
Gov. Contr. Year in Rev. Br. 6 (Feb. 2019), papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439736.
Another problem with the GAO report at the
center of the current debate, as Grier notes, is that
the GAO report suggests that “the value of procurement agreements should be determined by the size
of covered procurement, as opposed to whether the
parties are offering comparable coverage in terms of
the entities, goods and services subject to the agreements.” Jean Heilman Grier, “GAO Procurement
Report: Valid Criticisms, Questionable Comparison,”
trade.djaghe.com/?p=3820. This approach to trade
agreements—sometimes called “dollar-for-dollar reciprocity”—ignores the huge size disparities between
procurement markets, the practical impossibility of
opening markets on a rigidly reciprocal basis, and the
collateral diplomatic and economic benefits of a shift
to open trade (discussed below).
The 2017 GAO report further overlooked the fact
that, currently, among the GPA parties, only the U.S.
has in place effective enforcement machinery—under
the Trade Agreements Act—to exclude and penalize
suppliers from non-GPA parties. In the EU and at
least some other GPA parties, in contrast, bids from
suppliers that are not strictly entitled to participate
often “slip through the cracks.” That may change,
however, if the U.S. abandons the GPA. The EU has
been considering similar enforcement mechanisms for
years, see, e.g., European Parliament, “A New EU In© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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ternational Procurement Instrument,” www.europarl.
europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-andprogressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/
file-international-procurement-instrument-(ipi); Jean
Heilman Grier, “EU: New Push for Measure to Open
Procurement,” trade.djaghe.com/?p=5628. In the
event of an abrupt U.S. withdrawal from the GPA,
the EU would be much more likely to put in place
enforcement measures to exclude U.S. suppliers from
EU procurements. See generally Jean Heilman Grier,
“Consequences of Potential U.S. Withdrawal from
GPA,” trade.djaghe.com/?p=6244.
Even more importantly, the GAO report never considered the new business opportunities for U.S. suppliers that will accrue when China, Russia, Brazil and
other emerging economies complete their accessions to
the GPA. These have been previously (and, in our view,
conservatively) estimated by the WTO Secretariat to
be valued at perhaps $500 billion annually. See Robert
D. Anderson et al., “Assessing the Value of Future Accessions,” supra. For example, while details of China’s
eventual market access commitments are still under
negotiation, at a minimum they will include (in addition to very significant central government purchases)
procurements by multiple cities larger than 10 million persons and by numerous major state-owned
enterprises. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, “China’s
New GPA Offer: Enhances Accession Prospects” (Nov.
7, 2019), trade.djaghe.com/?p=6073; Skye Mathieson, “Note: Accessing China’s Public Procurement Market: Which State-Influenced Enterprises Should the
WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement Cover?,”
40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 233 (2010). The opportunities available to U.S. suppliers will, moreover, grow over time if
the rapid growth of the Chinese economy continues.
Cutting-edge economic research further illuminates the economic benefits accruing from the GPA.
Such research emphasizes that the welfare gains for
participating states from the liberalization of public
procurement markets go beyond narrow market
access considerations and include broader benefits,
such as strengthened competition, the availability
of new technologies, and better value for money in
procurement markets. For a review of this emerging
literature, see Zornitsa Kutlina-Dimitrova, “Can We
Put a Price on Extending the Scope of the GPA? A
First Quantitative Assessment,” EU Commission,
DG Trade, Chief Economist Note, Issue 1 (Mar. 2017),
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/march/tradoc_155456.pdf.
3
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Another important benefit of the GPA is that,
because the GPA requires the parties’ consensus to
change, it plays a key role in checking policy “backsliding”—the weakening of commitments to open
markets and the introduction of new restrictive
measures in times of economic crisis and/or political
exigency. See Bernard Hoekman, “Reducing Home Bias
in Public Procurement: Trade Agreements and Good
Governance,” 24 Global Governance 249 (2018). By
constraining sharp swings in protectionism, the GPA
reduces risks for governments (and firms) that invest
in efficient cross-border supply chains.
The GAO report also did not address how U.S.
withdrawal from the GPA would disrupt the latticework of global free trade agreements. The government
procurement chapters of U.S. regional and bilateral
free trade agreements—which provide important
market access to U.S. suppliers—are typically modelled directly on the GPA. Abandoning the GPA would
encourage a proliferation of different models and
approaches, which would create costly uncertainty
for suppliers. See, e.g., Robert D. Anderson, Anna
Caroline Müller & Philippe Pelletier, “Regional Trade
Agreements and Procurement Rules: Facilitators or
Hindrances?,” in A. Georgopoulos, B. Hoekman & P.
Mavroidis (eds.), The Internationalization of Government Procurement Regulation 55 (Oxford Univ. Press,
2016), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2707219.
Additional Practical Implications for U.S.
Contractors if the U.S. Abandons the GPA—
Abandoning the GPA could carry additional serious—
and potentially costly—implications at home for U.S.
contractors, if the U.S. finds itself locked in years of
bilateral negotiations to replace the GPA:
• Suppliers in the federal market are likely to
shift aggressively towards the commercial
“electronic marketplaces” that the General
Services Administration plans to open soon,
under a pending “pilot” procurement. See
Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment, “U.S.
Government To Award Billions Of Dollars In
Contracts To Open Electronic Marketplaces
To Government Customers—Though Serious
Questions Remain,” 61 GC ¶ 303. Users will
be able to make micro-purchases directly from
online marketplaces (Amazon is the leading
commercial example). Those micro-purchases
would be exempt from the Buy American Act.
Because many more federal procurements will
4
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become subject to the Buy American Act if the
U.S. withdraws from the GPA, and the Trump
Administration is simultaneously increasing
price preferences under the Act, see Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment, “Trump Executive Order Calls For More Aggressive Use
Of The Buy American Act—An Order Likely To
Have More Political Than Practical Effect,” 61
GC ¶ 219, direct user purchases from the coming “electronic marketplaces” may well soar.
• Conversely, more traditional contracting vehicles such as the GSA Multiple Award Schedules, which rely on the Trade Agreements Act
exemption for purchases under the GPA, could
be thrown into chaos. Thousands of contracts
across the Government may need to be reviewed and renegotiated (at a potential cost of
billions of dollars) if the cornerstone to many
Trade Agreements Act certifications—U.S.
membership in the GPA—disappears.
• Withdrawing from the GPA also may cause
years of costly reordering in contractors’ supply
chains. If the U.S. moves to replace the GPA
with bilateral trade agreements negotiated
with other nations, U.S. suppliers may need to
seek out alternative sources of supply in those
nations—but during a period of high uncertainty and flux, similar to the current tariff
wars in U.S. commercial markets.
These are just some of the obvious potential impacts of dropping out of the GPA. Less predictable
indirect effects—such as possible retaliation against
U.S. suppliers selling abroad—should also be considered and taken seriously.
The Broader Strategic Context: Would a
GPA Withdrawal Undermine the Current Overwhelming U.S. Advantage in Defense Procurement?—Abandoning the GPA also could undermine
the reciprocal defense procurement agreements
between the U.S. and its allies, in Europe and elsewhere—reciprocal agreements in defense goods and
services which open markets around the world, and
help support the substantial U.S. trade surplus in
defense. Partially in response to Trump Administration initiatives, the EU has already launched the “European Defence Fund,” which could shield European
defense procurements from U.S. firms, in apparent
violation of the standing reciprocal defense procurement agreements. A U.S. move to abandon the GPA
could trigger other retaliatory measures in defense,
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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in Europe and elsewhere, as allies respond in kind to
U.S. protectionism—despite the security costs of closing what are, in fact, remarkably open defense markets under these reciprocal agreements. Withdrawing
from the GPA thus could pitch the Department of
Defense into years of efforts (like those currently underway in response to the European Defence Fund)
to reinforce these reciprocal agreements, which open
defense markets to facilitate mutual cooperation and
interoperability among U.S. allies. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, “How the Trump Administration May
Reshape International Procurement Markets—Defense and Electronic Marketplaces,” Gov. Contr. Year
in Rev. Br. (forthcoming Feb. 2020).
The Importance of U.S. Participation in the
GPA for the Rules-based Multilateral Trading
System—Ultimately, a U.S. withdrawal from the
WTO GPA would carry with it risks for the sustainability of the multilateral trading system as a whole.
The system, which is already under significant strain,
see, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott & Euijin Jung, “The WTO’s
Existential Crisis: How to Salvage Its Ability to Settle
Trade Disputes,” Peterson Inst. Int’l Econs. (Dec.
2019), www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/
pb19-19.pdf, depends on participating countries accepting the fundamental legitimacy of all of its parts,
rather than opting out at will from particular agreements or provisions that are deemed disadvantageous
at a particular point in time. Having been put in place
with over three-quarters of a century of strong U.S.
support, the GPA is an integral part of that system.
Given this, while it is impossible to foresee precisely
how other WTO members would respond if the U.S.
were to abandon its GPA commitments, they could
well retaliate in material ways, potentially further
disrupting international supply chains and fragmenting the global economy.
In sum, a U.S. withdrawal from the WTO GPA—as
is apparently being mulled by at least some elements
in the current administration—would entail very
significant risks for the U.S., its suppliers and the international trading system. It would, at a minimum,
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put at risk the market access opportunities that U.S.
businesses currently enjoy under the GPA, arguably
valued at over $1 trillion annually. It would deprive
the U.S. of an essential tool to set global standards as
procurement markets open internationally, notably in
the cases of China, Russia, Brazil and other emerging
economies expected to come into the GPA. It would
undermine the viability of the GPA as a template for
chapters on government procurement in regional and
bilateral free trade agreements (something that both
Republican and Democratic administrations have
found useful) and thus could create further costs and
uncertainties for industry. Withdrawing from the
GPA could undermine U.S. free trade agreements in
defense—an essential part of U.S. national security
and strength in world defense markets—and would
risk further weakening the already strained WTO
system. For all these reasons, it is hoped that the U.S.
can avoid the self-inflicted harms, direct and indirect,
that withdrawing from the GPA would entail.
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